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22 April 1946

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Admiral Somers

**SUBJECT:** Proposed Policy on Clearance of  
personnel for Duties with C.I.G.

**ENCLOSURE:** Memo for Director of Central Intelligence from  
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff, same sub-  
ject, dated 11 April (received by Secretary,  
W.I.A., on 15 April)

1. At the C.I.G. Council meeting this morning the following ques-  
tions were raised with reference to the enclosure:

a. Should the responsibility for security clearance rest with  
the departments, as provided in paragraph 6 of the proposed directive,  
or with the C.I.G.?

b. Is it necessary that the proposed directive be approved by  
the I.A.B., or should it be issued individually by the Director of  
Central Intelligence?

c. Should exceptions require concurrence by member departments  
of C.I.G., as provided in paragraph 12 of the proposed directive, or  
should the Director of Central Intelligence be authorized to make ex-  
ceptions as he sees fit?

2. With reference to 1-a above, it was agreed that in any case re-  
sponsibility for the security of C.I.G. rests with the Director, re-  
gardless of the arrangements for investigation and clearance of indi-  
viduals. Central Planning Staff feels that security clearance should  
be done by the departments as part of their responsibility for furnish-  
ing C.I.G. personnel, since the individuals are employees of the various  
departments. It was pointed out, however, that the proposed directive  
does not provide for mandatory review by C.I.G. It was also stated that  
investigation and clearance by the departments might take a considerable  
length of time (90 to 120 days in the case of War). Placing the re-  
sponsibility for investigation and clearance in C.I.G. rather than the  
departments would have the following effects:

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a. A larger security office in C.I.G. probably would be required.

b. Security checks would be expedited.

c. Final clearance would be performed in C.I.G. where the ultimate responsibility resides in any case.

3. It was believed that the answer to 1-b above depends on the answer to 1-g. If the departments are to be responsible for investigation and clearance, it appears appropriate to obtain the concurrence of the I.A.B. to the proposed directive. If C.I.G. is to conduct the investigation and clearance, the directive might be issued by the Director without reference to the I.A.B.

4. With reference to 1-g, one viewpoint was that the Director should be authorized to grant exceptions without further concurrences and their resultant delay. The other viewpoint was that the security representatives of the permanent I.A.B. members should concur in exceptions since C.I.G. personnel will be handling highly classified material from all departments.

5. The C.I.G. Council agreed that paragraph 3-g of the proposed directive should be re-worded as follows:

"of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power."

**"SIGNED"**

[Redacted Signature]

Secretary, N.I.A.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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✓	Assistant to the Director	
	Secretary, NIA	
	Chief of Operational Services	✓
	Chief, Central Planning Staff	
	Chief, Central Reports Staff	
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REMARKS :

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# MISSING PAGE

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

Attachments missing

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